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THE STATUS OF MAO TSE-TUNG AS THEORETICIAN AND LEADER

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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

There are signs that the composite reputation developed by Mao Tse-tung over the past fifteen years or so -- as Chinese Communist leader, Communist theoretician for East Asia, and protagonist of "peasant liberation" -- has recently been undergoing alteration. Within the past two years Mao has lost much of his former appearance of independence of the USSR, his teachings have been the subject of some controversy among Communists in East Asia, and Communist advocacy of the peasant, in which Mao had originally taken the lead, has given way to a more orthodox championing of labor and the "proletariat." While the first of these developments may represent a token obeisance to Soviet supremacy in the world Communist hierarchy, the second a temporary misunderstanding that has now been settled, and the third the abandonment of a convenient "fiction," there is in fact some possibility that Mao's status in the world Communist movement is currently in process of revision.

Several interacting and somewhat counterbalancing forces appear to govern Mao's future career. The Soviet fear of Titoism in Communist China has apparently led to the tightening of Soviet controls over the party mechanism in China, with obvious adverse consequences for Mao's independence of action both at home and

abroad. But, on the other hand, the rising tide of Soviet expansionism in Asia depends in large measure on Chinese cooperation in the application of Mao's tactics to other countries in East Asia. Both of these forces as they apply to Mao personally have been modified by a non-ideological aspect of the Chinese and all great revolutions, the difficulty that the leader of the struggle for power has in maintaining his position of preeminence under the new conditions following achievement of power.

Where these composite forces will take Mao is by no means clear. Any losses in prestige suffered by Mao as leader of China from the Soviet reaction to Tito will be offset at least partially by the Soviet need for his assistance in the conquest of Asia. But, on balance, it would appear that some diminution of Mao's prestige is to be expected and is in fact probably already under way.

No spectacular change in his status is, however, to be anticipated. What is most likely is his gradual devolution to a status more nearly approximating that of other satellite leaders. In that new status, Mao will probably continue to be unchallenged leader of Chinese Communism but will be granted the role of merely a minor prophet in other parts of Asia.

THE STATUS OF MAO TSE-TUNG AS THEORETICIAN AND LEADER

The reputation of Mao Tse-tung as a heroic world Communist figure is a comparatively recent phenomenon. In the mid-1930's Mao was still regarded as the tribal chieftan, the patriarchal Moses who had just brought his weary Communist flock through many hardships to the promised land of Northwest China.[1] The impetus for the exalting of Mao by his Chinese and world following was provided by several subsequent developments. An important impetus was Mao's adaptation to China of the world Communist tactic of the "united front,"[2] which made him appear as sponsor of Chinese unity against Japan. The reported performance of the Communists in the Japanese war added further to the Mao legend. A third source of glorification for Mao was the appearance that the Chinese Communists were "doing it on their own" during the long period of the late 1930's and early 1940's, when overt Chinese contacts with the USSR were largely absent. Mao the theoretician of international stature did not emerge, however, until after the publication in 1940 of New Democracy,

1. Edgar Snow in Red Star Over China (pp. 68-69) commented on Mao's status in 1936 as leader as follows: "I never met a Chinese Red who drivelled 'our great leader' phrases, I did not hear Mao's name used as a synonym for the Chinese people. ..."
2. Adopted at the Seventh Congress of the Comintern in 1935.

a primer of gradualist "colonial" or "people's" revolution that met a special need of the world Communist movement during the "honeymoon" years of World War II. These various reputations have been ostensibly enhanced by the Communist victories in the recent civil war (1946-49), which have been acknowledged among world Communists as ranking only behind the October Revolution of 1917, masterminded by Lenin, and the Soviet victory in World War II, directed by Stalin.

Only a few years ago neither the Chinese Communists nor sympathetic members of the world Communist camp hesitated to advance Mao's claims to a niche with the major prophets of Communism -- Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin. American observers in Yenan during 1944 and 1945 were told that Mao had "sinicised Marx,"[1] that is, successfully adapted Marx to the large peasant populations and vast rural land masses of Asia. The constitution adopted by the Chinese Communist Party in June 1945 adjured party members "to study Marxism-Leninism and the basic ideas of Mao Tse-tung." Subsequent eulogies were patterned on that of Liu Shao-ch'i in his 1945 "Report on Party Regulations," which declared Mao the personification of the Chinese Communist Party:

1. An expression from New Democracy.

"Our Party's historical roads were the historical roads early elucidated by our leader and comrade, Mao Tse-tung, on the basis of the special features of the Chinese Revolution. Comrade Mao Tse-tung's roads have most accurately and most completely represented our Party's history and the history of the Chinese race and the Chinese people's modern revolution. Notwithstanding the fact that Comrade Mao Tse-tung during certain several periods has been unable to decide the actions of the whole Party in form and organization, yet during these periods it has been more clearly indicated that the true history of our Party and the correct revolutionary direction of the property-less class of China and the Chinese people is in the direction of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, that it continues, exists, develops in the direction of Comrade Mao Tse-tung who is the representative and center (of the Party), that it is not in any other direction, and that it does not exist and develop in the direction of any other person as the center."

More recently, Anna Louise Strong, expatriate American journalist, in a book[1] that was carried in serial form in the world Communist

1. Tomorrow's China (New York, 1949), pp. 30-31 and 113:

"From his distant cave, Mao Tse-tung has become a world figure. His theses on 'Protracted War' became accepted formulas among American and other military experts, many of whom never knew whence they came. His theses on 'New Democracy' not only devised new forms of government for China but may have influenced the similar forms that appeared five years later in Eastern Europe. His analysis of China's revolution is studied eagerly in the colonial lands of Southeast Asia. In fact, Marxists all over the world agree that in order to understand the modern problems of Asia, it is necessary to study Mao's thought.

"'Mao's great achievement has been the application of Marxist thinking to Chinese problems,' said Liu Hsiao-chi, whom the Chinese considered their second ablest Marxist. 'Not only has Mao applied Marxist methods to solve the practical problems of China but he has popularized Marxism as a method for the Chinese people to use....'"

(Footnote continued on following page.)

press just before her arrest in Moscow in February 1949, described Mao as an Asian oracle and New Democracy as an Asian bible. Even today, New Democracy and certain other works by Mao remain the only textbooks of Marxism known to many Chinese Communist students.

I. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Yet within the late months of 1948 and early months of 1949 appeared evidence that Mao's reputation was undergoing alterations, certain of them standard for all non-Soviet Communist leaders in the postwar era. Somewhat more belatedly than his European counterparts, Mao proved his orthodoxy by proclaiming his party's allegiance to and dependence upon the USSR. At the same time, the Chinese Communist Party shifted rather abruptly from a twenty-year policy of "rural" revolution to the currently more "correct" policy of "urban" revolution, thus abandoning the once useful fiction of the "peasant-oriented" Mao. Moreover, as a consequence of the "hardening" of the Communist line in the Far East, Mao's theoretical standing was apparently given a thorough review. It is still too soon to ascertain whether Mao's latest metamorphosis in character as Communist leader

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"It is to Mao Tse-tung and to Communist China, much more than to present-day Moscow, that the nationalist revolutions of Indonesia, Indo-China, Burma, look for their latest, most practical ideas. Mao's strategy was made to fit such peoples; for China's problems are similar to theirs, and the people's revolution in China, also, must win against superior arms. That is why it interests the colonial insurgents of southeast Asia, who face the superior arms of Europe and America."

and theoretician amounts to a real change in status or represents only a realistic adjustment to a world full of potential Titos and is to be explained by a "hardening" Communist line.

The first token of Mao's change in character has been his abandonment of former appearances of independence. On October 31, 1948, in an article commemorating Russia's October Revolution, Mao delivered China into the camp of the USSR. In both March and July 1949, Mao performed the further ritual, which is now standard in satellite countries, of ascribing the Chinese success to the Soviet victories in World War II.[1] And if Chinese subservience to the USSR had not been sufficiently stressed by Mao, Liu Shao-ch'i this past October acknowledged direct Soviet aid in the Chinese civil war.[2]

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1. Mao Tse-tung, "On The People's Democratic Dictatorship," July 1, 1949, as quoted in FBIB, Daily Report, July 1, 1949, pp. PPP-18 and 19:

> "Let us think it over: If the Soviet Union did not exist, if there were no victory of the antifascist Second World War, and especially, for us, no defeat of Japanese imperialism, if the various new democratic countries of Europe did not come into being, if there were no rising struggles of the oppressed nations in the east, if there were no struggles of the masses of peoples in the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and other capitalist countries against the reactionary clique ruling over them, and if there were no sum total of these things, then the international reactionary forces bearing down on us would surely be far greater than at present.
>
> "Could we have won victory under such circumstances? Obviously not."

2. This admission was made in a speech of October 5. (FBIB, Daily Report, October 10, 1949, p. PPP-2)

The policy of peasant revolution identified with Mao was abruptly terminated at a Central Committee plenum in March 1949, with the following announcement:

> "Under the leadership of Chairman Mao Tse-tung, the party united broad masses of the laboring people and carried out this policy of utilizing the countryside to encircle the cities. History has proved that this policy is fully necessary, entirely correct, and also entirely successful. But the period of adopting this way of working is now ended. The period has now begun of working from the cities to the countryside and the leadership of the countryside from the cities."[1]

Although convenient for the periods of united front and civil war, the abandoned policy apparently proved both inconsistent with Communist plans for administering newly acquired Chinese cities and industries and unsuitable for the campaign, demanded by the issue of "Titoism," to reestablish the party on a "proletarian" base. The attendant reversion of Mao to the open role of "proletarian" leader (throughout the Communist sojourn in the Chinese countryside, Mao apparently maintained his party's theoretical identification with the proletariat) may have been accompanied by a loss of prestige, but Mao appears to have taken it in his stride.

That Mao's status as prophet has also become controversial is suggested by certain further developments. The

1. FBIB, Daily Report, March 25, 1949, pp.CCC-1 and 2.

phase of "people's democracy" or coalition government that he foretold in New Democracy in 1940 has now been openly defined in world Communist circles as a short preparatory stage for socialism, a stage in which government is an acknowledged form of the "dictatorship of the proletariat."[1] Ramifications of this shift in line are found as far afield as India, where a factional war has been going on between the present "revolutionary" leadership and the Mao-oriented "reformist" minority, which was itself ousted from an earlier position of leadership in March 1948. The new leaders of Indian Communism have recently had occasion to dispute Mao's status as a prophet, further accuse Mao of "deviations" and "false formulations," and even deny the validity

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1. Georgi Dimitrov, "Report To The Central Committee of The Bulgarian Workers' Party," December 19, 1948, as quoted in D-21, Sofia, February 4, 1949, UNCLASSIFIED:
   "(a) The people's democratic state represents a power of the toiling people -- of the overwhelming majority of the people, under the leadership of the Working class....
   "(b) The people's democratic state is a state in the transitional period, destined to ensure the development of the state on the path to Socialism."
   Joszef Revai, "On the Character of Our People's Democracy," Tarsadelmi Szemle, March-April, 1949, as quoted in D-365, Budapest, May 11, 1949, RESTRICTED:
   "Comrade Rakosi's statement affirmed that the people's democracy is a dictatorship of the proletariat, though not in the Soviet form, that our people's democracy fulfills the functions of the dictatorship of the proletariat.... It is obvious that our people's democracy has not been from the beginning a dictatorship of the proletariat, but became so during the struggle."

of the peasant revolution of Communist China for India.[1] Moreover, in February 1949, on the eve of the publication of her Tomorrow's China, Anna Louise Strong, one of Mao's chief foreign advocates,

1. Editorial Board, Indian Communist Party, "Struggle For People's Democracy and Socialism -- Some Questions of Strategy and Tactics," Communist (June-July 1949, pp 76-89 excerpted):

> "We must state emphatically that the Communist Party of India has accepted Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin as the authoritative sources of Marxism. It has not discovered new sources of Marxism beyond these.... Such claims have proved too often to be a thin cloak for revisionism...."
>
> "Since the Andhra Secretariat quotes Mao against the understanding of world situation and People's Democracy as given by Zhdanov and CPSU (B), it is necessary to examine some of the formulations.... Some of Mao's formulations are such that no Communist Party can accept them.... It is obvious that this idea of promoting capitalism is reactionary and counter-revolutionary.... No Marxist can ever agree with this reactionary formulation.... Mao in fighting polemically against certain deviations himself steps into new deviations."
>
> "Those who contrast the Chinese and Russian way have many wrong things in their mind. First, their idea about Russian Revolution is wrong. They think the Russian Revolution was achieved suddenly on November 7 -- a one-day show, a sort of coup -- and forget the dogged fight of three decades, the persistent effort to win over the majority of the people during the revolution and before. They also forget the civil war.
> "Secondly, when they contrast and uphold what they call the Chinese way, they seek to reject the hegemony of the proletariat in the democratic revolution and feel that the Chinese revolution shows that the hegemony of the proletariat is not necessary. All the indirect references to general strike and general rising being out of date, guerrilla warfare in agrarian areas, civil war and prolonged struggle really conceal the idea that the leadership of the proletariat is not necessary. This attempt is done in the name of anti-feudal revolution, agrarian revolution, etc. -- in short a theory of peasant leadership. Its anti-Marxist character stands exposed."

was arrested in Moscow as an "imperialist spy." Finally, Soviet messages on the occasion of the founding of the new Chinese "people's democracy" on October 1, 1949 ignored with some finality Mao's claim to original theory. That of Pravda of October 6 explains the Chinese victories thus:

> "The victory of Chinese democracy has been prepared by the whole course of historic development. The Great October Socialist Revolution signified a cardinal turn in the history of mankind, undermined the power of imperialism in colonial and dependent countries, has awakened the oppressed masses in the Far East and opened a new chapter in their struggle for liberation. It opened also a new page in the history of China. The undying flame of the great ideas of Lenin and Stalin lit the hearts of millions of simple Chinese people. The existence of the Socialist Soviet State in the neighborhood of China, its mighty development, its revolutionary experience and its fraternal solidarity, were facilitating and inspiring the antiimperialistic and antifeudal struggle of the Chinese working masses.
>
> "The great geniuses of mankind, Lenin and Stalin, foresaw the revolutionary upsurge in China. They have elaborated a teaching on a national colonial revolution during the epoch of imperialism which is going on under the leadership of a working class and under the banner of internationalism. This teaching enlarged the golden thesaurus of Marxism-Leninism. Comrade Stalin gave the analysis of particularities and conditions of a victory of an anti-imperialistic and antifeudal revolution.
>
> "The Chinese Communist Party basing itself on the scientific theory of communism was the basic force in the struggle for national independence and for the victory of a People's Democracy in China."[1]

1. FBIB, Daily Report (European Section), October 6, 1949, pp. AA-6 and 7. Yet Mao had claimed on July 1 that "twenty-four years have elapsed since Sun Yat-sen's death, and under the leadership of the Communist Party of China, Chinese revolutionary theory and practice have made big strides forward, fundamentally changing the features of China." ("On the People's Democratic Dictatorship," July 1, 1949, as quoted in FBIB, Daily Report, July 1, 1949.)

Naturally this series of events raises a question as to Mao's standing as oracle of the Asian movement. A partial answer was apparently provided recently at the meetings of the Asian branches of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) in Pei-p'ing. At those meetings, Mao's teachings were proclaimed applicable to the "liberation movements" in all Asian countries. This publicity and the importance apparently attached to Chinese leadership in the WFTU-coordinated Soviet drive for Asia suggests that a redefinition rather than a reduction in Mao's status may have been under way.

In any event, Mao's appearance before the world as Communist leader and theoretician has been in a process of change, and because such change has accompanied extremely provocative world events -- the advent of Titoism and the Communist victories in China, for example -- an examination of the forces shaping Mao's future would seem in order.

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II. THE FUTURE OF MAO TSE-TUNG

Three major factors will probably shape Mao Tse-tung's future: (1) the implications of the Tito controversy for China, (2) the new phase of the Chinese revolution, and (3) the situation of Communism in East Asia.

A. Implications of Titoism for Communist China

In the long run the Chinese Communists can avoid only with great care and difficulty the fate that seems inevitably to await any active partner of the USSR, that of being made a completely subservient satellite of the USSR.[1] Moscow is aware of the favorable setting for Titoism in China. In countering the danger of Chinese independence, Soviet leaders will probably be more strongly influenced by fear than by the Leninist doctrine of "free federation,"[2] respect for the problems demanding a flexible Communist policy and leadership in China, or concern for the reactions of nationalist elements in East Asia.

1. This observation is reinforced by the rapid intensification of Soviet control over the countries of Eastern Europe, most strikingly illustrated in the recent appointment of Marshal Rokossovsky as Soviet proconsul in Poland.
2. Although variously interpreted today, this doctrine may be taken to mean that Communist-controlled countries shall associate on a "free" and "voluntary" basis. In the days of the Comintern, national freedom was theoretically abridged only by the principle of "democratic centralism" -- that is, the International was centrally administered and the majority ruled. Today, in the absence of a formal association of parties, "free federation" is construed by the Kremlin as "adhering to the Soviet camp," and recognizing the "superiority" of the USSR, but is taken by Tito and the Yugoslavs more nearly at its original meaning. The Chinese Communists show evidence of moving from an intermediate position to the Soviet extreme.

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The existence of such Soviet fear may be inferred both from statements in the world Communist press and from the increasing Soviet penetration of Communist China. The US Daily Worker[1] interpreted the new urban program of March 1949 as "meeting Titoism in advance." Both the Daily Worker and the Czech Communist publication Rudé Pravo[2] quoted the Chinese delegate to the Prague Peace Congress as saying "there is not, will not and cannot be any Tito in China." The several versions of Liu Shao-chi's general treatise of November 1948, "On Internationalism," that appeared in June 1949 in the Soviet and satellite press had each been doctored to include new and more specific anti-Tito remarks.[3] Mao's recent declarations of subservience to the USSR may be taken as a Chinese concession to the Soviet fear, and repeated Chinese Communist charges that the US now intends to "bore from within" their movement may be viewed as a warning to the West that they will not be compromised into appearing Titoist.

Simultaneously with these press statements have appeared reports that the Soviet party is infiltrating its brother party in Pei-p'ing. Some evidence is available that the Kremlin has had a voice in Communist military policy, and reports that the USSR trained the important Manchurian

1. April 1, 1949.
2. Daily Worker of May 4, 1949, and Rudo Pravo of June 14, 1949.
3. Compare, for example, the original broadcast text (FBIB, Daily Report, November 10, 1948, pp. CCC 1-5 and November 12, 1948, pp. PPP 7-11) and the text issued in For A Lasting Peace, For A People's Democracy, July 1, 1949, p. 6. It will be noted that the original text referred specifically to Tito only once.

cadres of the People's Liberation Armies were at least partially confirmed by Liu Shao-ch'i in his speech of October 5, 1949. The Chinese Communist secret police appears to be penetrated and in part directed by Soviet agents. Soviet censorship of the press and of the moving pictures shown in parts of Communist China seems a fact. Soviet "technicians" are to be seen in increasing numbers in the more important Chinese industries, their presence acknowledged by the Communist leaders. Manchuria's resources are at the disposal of the Kremlin.[1] Moreover, Soviet advisers in Pei-p'ing are suspected of having had a hand in the recent curbing of the activities of Communist officials possessing contacts with both the National Government and the US.

At the worst such infiltration can eventuate in Soviet control of the mechanism of Chinese Communist power, drastically reducing the Chinese Communist capabilities for independent action either within China or toward the rest of the world. Although Titoist sentiments might thereby be enhanced, the chances are that mass defection by the Chinese Communist Party from the ranks of Soviet-led Communists would then be out of the question. Party independence in this case would be conceivable only where revolt against inflexible Soviet-issued policies might arise, that is, among the many rural party leaders who must heed popular sentiment and are remote from Pei-p'ing's control.

1. The USSR appears to exercise some form of control over most of Manchuria; Soviet troops are located in several major cities; important communications lines, industries, and ports are apparently administered by the USSR in accordance with the provisions of the Sino-Soviet Treaty and Agreements of 1945; and the Soviet-Manchurian Trade Agreement of 1949 provides for the exchange of Manchurian raw materials for certain unspecified industrial wares. Communications with China proper are limited.

However, certain forces still hinder the realization of the most extreme eventuality. The USSR presumably still has some concern that infringement of Chinese Communist autonomy not injure Chinese Communist chances of survival. Much of the reputation of East Asian Communism as a preeminently native and nationalist force hinges on Soviet treatment of the Chinese Communists. Furthermore, much of the party mechanism still appears to be in the hands of the present Chinese Communist leaders.[1] The rank and file of party members are loyal only to Mao. Army commanders seem to know only one allegiance, and that is to the old-line party directors. Thus, although the era of "friendly independence" of Moscow on the part of the directors of the Chinese Communist movement may now be over, important further changes must be made before Communist China is reduced to the status of a helpless Soviet puppet.

B. The New Phase of the Chinese Revolution

It is almost a truism among students of revolution that the engineers of the violent phase of revolution, that is, the transfer of power, are not automatically assured of major roles in the peaceful phase of revolution, the creation of "utopia." Even without the implications of Titoism, Mao may thus have found himself in early 1949 facing the main challenge of his career as national leader, that of effecting the transition to the era of responsibility in China.

1. Despite the apparent unanimity of top party figures on major issues, important differences of opinion are believed to exist. Whether the Kremlin will utilize such differences to promote Moscow-trained leaders to power will obviously affect the future of Mao.

An accurate appraisal of Mao's ability to meet this challenge is impossible in the absence of adequate knowledge of his recent experience. If Mao in recent years has played the role of "grand strategist" and devoted large portions of his energies to pondering questions of military, social, and esthetic theory, or if he has tended to confine his leadership to moderating between factions (and both are possibilities), he may have incurred severe personal handicaps in solving the administrative problems of the new regime. The Chinese Communists must, on the short term, get their national government working smoothly, establish satisfactory control over the diverse regions of China, inaugurate foreign trade, allocate a limited food supply to a hungry population, install a dependable fiscal system, and pacify dissident social groups. In addition, the Communists face such long-term problems as promoting economic development in the face of an almost inevitable rise in population, placing the labor force under strict restraints, placating some dissident groups and crushing others, maintaining public morale, and restricting excessive nationalism. None of these problems is simple and they will be further complicated by the Soviet requirement that certain solutions be adapted from the experience of the USSR.

Whatever Mao's present qualifications, the challenge of these problems is obviously great. The Chinese leader may be persuaded to plunge more deeply into the stream of everyday affairs, utilizing the varied administrative experience gained in the 1930's and early 1940's.

However, both age (Mao is 56, an advanced age for Chinese) and health (recurrent tuberculosis is again reported to be gaining the upper hand) may dull the edge of this desire.

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C. The Situation of Communism in East Asia

The apparent decision of the Kremlin to apply to most countries of East Asia the tactics developed by Mao for China[1] tends to offset certain losses recently incurred by Mao both through Soviet fear of Titoism in China and changes of Communist line in Asia. In the event that the tide of Soviet expansionism in East Asia continues to be strong, Mao may well be assured of the qualified role of "teacher for Asia," that is, his teachings may be given tactical application in most of the area and his lieutenants may be placed in positions of prominence in the organization that is responsible for coordinating Communist tactics there. It is unlikely, however, that Mao's ideology will have the universal validity for colonial nations once hoped for it or that the Chinese Communists will possess independent organizational authority throughout East Asia.

1. Ideology. Depite the WFTU's recent affirmation of the tactical features of New Democracy, the general theses of Mao's major opus have lost some of their applicability through postwar shifts in the Communist line. At one time the Chinese apparently hoped to have these theses accepted as the gospel for "liberation" of Asia:

> "On every kind of problem -- the nation, the peasants, strategy, the construction of the Party, literature and culture, finance and economy, methods of work, philisophy -- Mao has applied Marxist principles to

1. This decision was made public at the recent WFTU meetings in Pei-p'ing. It was recognized at those meetings that the situations in India, Burma, and Japan differed from the situations in Indochina, Indonesia, Malaya, Thailand, and the Philippines; Mao's tactics would presumably apply to the latter areas.

> new conditions and given those principles a new development. He is the first Marxist in Asia to succeed in doing so."[1]

And the warm reception of the theses by the Indian Communists, led by the reformist P.C. Joshi, certainly strengthened the Chinese hope.[2]

Yet even on its publication in 1940 Mao's thesis had no relevance to the situation in semi-industrial, "imperialist" Japan. Moreover, its pertinence for the other countries of East Asia was placed in serious doubt as a consequence of several changes in the Asiatic line during the period following the war. In February 1948, Communists through much of the Far East were instructed at a conference of Asian youth to abandon former "reformist" policies (supporting the united front, relying on the peasants, and playing down the role of labor) and embark on a course of extremist violence (terminating wartime coalitions, inciting strikes, and hastily improvising insurrections). This shift was marked by the rise or return to power in several parties of Soviet-trained leaders potentially unfriendly to Mao.[3] At

1. Tomorrow's China, p. 31, quoting from Liu Shao-ch'i.
2. See Anna Louise Strong, The Chinese Conquer China (New York, 1949), p. 12.
3. Notably Ranadie in India and Muso in Indonesia. Indochina appears to be the chief exception to this shift in line.

the same time, the Kremlin, through its mouthpiece, E. Zhukov,[1] cast some doubt on current Chinese Communist versions of collaborating with nationalist bourgeoisie, by pointing out how untrustworthy an ally in the revolution the "big" nationalist bourgeoisie had proved to be. This doubt and the new interpretations of "people's democracy" stemming from the Tito question in Europe have been recently used by the new leadership in India both to hammer the former leader, Joshi, and to discredit New Democracy as his theoretical defense.

The issue of the partinence of Mao's writings to Asia was at least nominally settled at the recent meetings of the Asian Trade Union Conference in Pei-p'ing. Mao's tactics of establishing a "united front" and employing armed forces in open civil war were approved for the Communist parties of the many countries of East Asia where guerrilla violence is now extant, e.g., Indochina, Indonesia, Malaya, Thailand, and the Philippines. Other

1. Director of the Soviet Pacific Ocean Institute. See his article, "The Sharpening of The Crisis of The Colonial System," Bolshevik No. 23, December 15, 1947, pp. 51-64. In this article Zhukov says:

> "As an outgrowth of the general process of industrial development in the colonies and semi-colonies and as an outgrowth of the harsh sharpening of the class conflict accompanying this development, the big national bourgeoisie recoils all the more from the mass liberation movement and places itself more and more on the path of plain betrayal of national interests. In the end, this will inevitably lead, and already in some places is leading, to the complete isolation of the big national bourgeoisie from the people. The further advanced a colonial country is along the path of industrial development and the stronger and more numerous is its proletariat, the more readily inclined is the bourgeosie toward a union with the imperialists against the workers, and the less capable it is of serious participation in the national-liberation movement. Moreover, the big bourgeoisie in a number of colonial and dependent countries is even disposed to value 'imperial connections' more than independence. It is actively engaged in these 'connections' through the system of credit, banks, and the general chain of capitalistic colonial exploitation; and while the big bourgeoisie plays a subordinate role in this chain, it nevertheless feels assured against social shocks."

tactics will obviously be required in the industrially more advanced, non-guerrilla countries of India and Japan. However, a theme of "proletarian revolution" (i.e., a revolution organized by labor and with the overt objective of one-party rule)[1] replaces Mao's theme of "new democratic revolution" (i.e., the waging of struggle by a bona fide coalition of classes under proletarian supervision), which in turn had supplanted the old Leninist-Stalinist theory of the "bourgeois democratic revolution" (i.e., the achievement of independence by a national capitalist movement in which the proletariat plays a junior role).

The end result of the past two years of ideological jockeying in East Asia has been to make labor the chief ostensible instrument and the Communists the admitted beneficiaries of the "colonial liberation" struggle. Explanation has thereby been provided for the recent glorification of the virtually non-existent labor organizations in Southeast Asia (that of Indochina has been cited as playing a major role in the guerrilla war against the French), the increased publicity given to "urbanism" and "proletarianism" in Communist China, and the recent indications that the "Democratic People's Coalition Front" of Communist North Korea will soon be replaced by one-party rule.

2. Organization. The expectation voiced by Anna Louise Strong that

1. In this connection it is important to note that labor will not rely on its own strength but will organize armed forces among the peasants. See especially the recantation of Li Li-san. (FBIB, Daily Report, November 28, 1949, pp. PPP 17-23)

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Pei-p'ing would become the Moscow of East Asia has not materialized in the way the expatriate journalist anticipated.[1] Not a Chinese organization but a so-called "international" organization has been given the task of "freeing" colonial Asia, and not Chinese but indigenous populations of the various countries are to be the major instruments for carrying out this task. Like the European Cominform, the new WFTU Liaison Bureau for Asia is probably under firm Soviet control and enforces strict discipline upon its members. Moreover, its chief agencies are the native Communist, non-Chinese parties of the various East Asiatic countries. The function of the Chinese under the auspices of this organization apparently is to transmit advice, carry on intelligence, make arms available, and adopt the proper diplomatic postures toward the "imperialist" West. Evidence for this conclusion are the resolutions and speeches of the conference of Asian trade unions in Pei-p'ing; the recent orders, issued through the local Chinese Communist press, that Thailand Chinese, although rightly oriented to China, should not "interfere in Thailand's internal struggles";[2] recent efforts of the Malayan Communists to hold down Chinese Communist activities; and resuscitation of the local parties in areas where formerly the Chinese Communists had been independently active (e.g., Malaya, Thailand).

Should the Chinese Communists wish to expand their organizational role in East Asia they possess important advantages, including great prestige,

1. See Tomorrow's China, p. 113.
2. See A-464, Bangkok, October 14, 1949.

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central location, and deep-lying historical affinity for the other peoples of East Asia. These assets were exploited during the years of World War II, when certain of the present North Korean leaders (whose influence has since been seriously diminished) were trained at Yenan and the Japanese leader Nosaka came under the Chinese spell. Echoes of those years are still to be heard in the speeches of Nosaka, including his recent advocacy of a new and Communist "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" under Chinese Communist sponsorship.

Offsetting these advantages, of course, are the implied Soviet opposition to creation of a "Balkan bloc" in East Asia (whether by a Chinese Dimitrov or Tito); the growing domestic subservience of Communist China to the USSR; increasing anti-Chinese sentiment in South Asia; and the emphasis on more purely tactical features of Mao's revolutionary theories.